Reinsurance Law Blog : Oklahoma Insurance Lawyer & Attorney : Stauffer & Nathan Law Firm

The city of Kinloch, Missouri, had an insurance policy with Scottsdale.  The policy had 4 parts:  four separate “coverage forms” that apply to various types of claims, including “Employment Practices Liability Coverage Form Claims Made Coverage,” “General Liability Coverage Form Occurrence Coverage,” “Law Enforcement Liability Coverage Form Occurrence Coverage,” and “Public Officials Liability Coverage Form Claims Made Coverage.” Each “Coverage Form” has its own definitions, exclusions and declarations page. There was also a general exclusion page which applied to all the coverages.

In the General Liability Coverage form, there was a jail exclusion, but that exclusion did not appear in the general exclusions applicable to all coverages.  Thus, the appellate court found there was a fact issue which precluded summary judgment.  Summary judgment would only be appropriate if there was no insurance (and therefore, no sovereign immunity).

Lashober v. City of Kinloch

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

The Missouri Western Court of Appeals for the Western District was looking at an auto policy to determine if the liability coverage "stacked."  In finding that the policy was ambiguous, the Court indicates that exclusions make a policy ambiguous.

In Durbin v. Detrick, Durbin was injured by Deitrick, [the insured or covered individual], while Deitrick was operating a vehicle he did not own. Because Deitrick’s four personal automotive liability policies are ambiguous as to whether they may be stacked in this specific circumstance, we must construe the policy language against American Family and in favor of permitting stacking of Deitrick’s four liability policies. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court found for the insured, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court notes: “Where an insurance policy promises the insured something at one point but then takes it away at another, there is an ambiguity.” Thus, “if policy language is ambiguous as to whether stacking is permitted, we construe the language of the policy against the insurer and in favor of stacking.”

The Court concluded “that while the Limits of Liability provision and Section 3 of the General Provisions in the American Family policies appear to generally prohibit the stacking of multiple liability policies, the language of the second sentence of the Other Insurance provision, analogous to that of Ritchie and Niswonger, could reasonably be understood by a lay person to indicate an exception to this general prohibition in the specific case where liability coverage is afforded for injuries incurred through use of a vehicle not owned by a covered individual.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Choice of Law / Service of Suit Endorsement

Cook was used a policy by Admiral. Cook told Admiral of a claim in Oklahoma. Admiral said the policy did not count the claim and that Texas laws applied because the policy was delivered to Cook in Texas.

The court disagreed finding that the service of suit endorsement allowed Oklahoma law to apply. In the Service of suit endorsement, Admiral agreed it could be sued in  any court of competent jurisdiction and that all matters would he determined in accordance of the law and practices of such court.

Since the suit was filed in Oklahoma, the court found that Oklahoma law applied.  Further, fact questions precluded summary judgment on whether the pollution exclusion applied and also whether the insured acted in bad faith.

Fossil Creek v. Cook’s, 2010 Ok Civ App 123

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks