Implicit allegations of defamation doesn't invoke a duty to defend

In Novell, Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Company, the 10th Circuit affirmed defendant-appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff-Appellant (Novell) was sued by another company (SCO) in Utah state court for slander of title. Novell requested Defendant-Appellee’s (Vigilant) defense in the slander action pursuant to a general liability insurance contract which required Vigilant to pay for any personal injury that Novell was obligated to pay. The Policy defined personal injury to include electronic, oral, written or other publication of material that libels or slanders a person or organization. Vigilant refused to defend because SCO’s asserted allegations would not constitute personal injury. Novell sought declaratory relief in state court. After both parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Vigilant.  Novell appealed.   The Court’s standard was whether the allegations, if proved, could result in liability under the policy. Novell asserted that SCO’s alleged facts in the slander of title cause of action implicitly asserted a claim for defamation  and was thus subject to coverage under the insurance contract.  Specifically, Novell argued the alleged statements concerning proper copyright ownership could give rise to a potential cause of action for defamation because it called into question  SCO’s honesty and significantly harmed SCO’s business reputation. The 10th Circuit wasn’t persuaded and held that since SCO did not allege that Novell’s statements impeached SCO’s honesty, integrity , virtue, etc., then Novell’s contention that the allegations implicitly calls SCO dishonest is just” too great a stretch.” Although SCO’s complaint focused on a copyright ownership dispute and the complaint alleges injury to SCO’s business reputation, the absence of allegations of defamatory comments persuaded the court to affirm the  trial court’s decision. 
 

Author John Grisham remains an Innocent Man

The 10th Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit against John Grisham and others for the book, The Innocent Man.  The book details the wrongful conviction of Williamson and Fritz for the rape and murder of Debra Sue Carter. Both men were later exonerated after spending over a decade in jail.

(Ok, this isn't an insurance case, but I found it interesting)

The plaintiffs were Oklahoma District Attorney William Peterson; former Shawnee police officer Gary Rogers; and former Oklahoma state criminologist Melvin Hett each of whom played a role in the investigation or prosecution and conviction of Williamson and Fritz. The book did not portray these folks in a positive light, so they sued Grisham and others, claiming defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false light invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that since the plaintiffs were public officials, any statements critical of them were privileged, so long as there was no accusation of criminal activity.  

Because no special damages were claimed, the plaintiffs had to allege libel per se; but 12 OS § 1443.1 applied because the plaintiffs were public officers and states that “[a]ny and all criticisms upon the official acts of any and all public officers” are privileged and cannot be considered libelous, unless a defendant makes a false allegation that the official engaged in criminal behavior. To fall into this category, “the words alleged to have been spoken of the plaintiff, when taken in their plainest and most natural sense, and as they would be ordinarily understood, [must] obviously import the commission of crime punishable by indictment.”

 

The court states: 

Plaintiffs point to no statement in which defendants directly accuse any plaintiff of a crime.

Plaintiffs expect us to scale a mountain of inferences in order to reach the conclusion that defendants’ statements impute criminal acts to plaintiffs and render the statutory privilege of § 1443.1 inapplicable. We decline to engage in such inferential analysis, or to take a myriad of other analytical leaps plaintiffs ask us to make. Any connection between defendants’ statements and an accusation of criminal activity is far too tenuous for us to declare them as unprivileged for purposes of § 1443.1.

Since the statements were privileged for defamation purposes, the court found them privileged for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and for false light invasion of privacy.

See, Peterson v. Grisham