Police pursuit

In two decisions today the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided cases which involve police pursuits. In one, the court said the police could be liable for damages caused when the pursued vehicle causes an accident with an innocent citizen, and in the other the court held that the tort claims act did not provide immunity under the “recognized standards” exception to liability. The dissent in the first case indicates that such a change in the law should be done by the legislature, not the courts. See, State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Public Safety v. Gurich, 2010 OK 56 (law enforcement could be liable for damages caused by fleeing vehicle; reckless disregard standard used) ; and Ray v. Broken Arrow Police Dept., 2010 OK 57 (the exemption from liability for "[a]cts or omissions done in conformance with then current recognized standards" did not apply, reversing summary judgment to the police department.

Oklahoma's Tort Claims Act does not prohibit action against City for loss covered by insurance

In Salazar Roofing & Construction, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 2010 OK 34, a city dump truck driver backed up into Salazar’s dump truck, causing damages. The City admitted that the city driver was in the course and scope of his employment and admitted liability, but claimed it was only liable for Salazar’s insurance deductible. The City claimed that an exclusion from liability for “Any claim or action based on the theory of indemnification or subrogation;” applied and precluded any liability in excess of the insurance deductible, since the loss had been paid by Salazar’s insurer. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that “the Claim filed under the Governmental Torts Claim Act by Salazar was filed in Salazar's name, directly against the tortfeasor, for the benefit of the owner of the damaged vehicle. The action was not filed by the insurance carrier to recoup the amount paid to insured. Therefore it appears that this matter is a first-party claim, not a claim for subrogation. No subrogation is at issue in the instant matter. There is no party secondarily liable for the damage caused by the City's negligence present in the case at bar.”

Author John Grisham remains an Innocent Man

The 10th Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit against John Grisham and others for the book, The Innocent Man.  The book details the wrongful conviction of Williamson and Fritz for the rape and murder of Debra Sue Carter. Both men were later exonerated after spending over a decade in jail.

(Ok, this isn't an insurance case, but I found it interesting)

The plaintiffs were Oklahoma District Attorney William Peterson; former Shawnee police officer Gary Rogers; and former Oklahoma state criminologist Melvin Hett each of whom played a role in the investigation or prosecution and conviction of Williamson and Fritz. The book did not portray these folks in a positive light, so they sued Grisham and others, claiming defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false light invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that since the plaintiffs were public officials, any statements critical of them were privileged, so long as there was no accusation of criminal activity.  

Because no special damages were claimed, the plaintiffs had to allege libel per se; but 12 OS § 1443.1 applied because the plaintiffs were public officers and states that “[a]ny and all criticisms upon the official acts of any and all public officers” are privileged and cannot be considered libelous, unless a defendant makes a false allegation that the official engaged in criminal behavior. To fall into this category, “the words alleged to have been spoken of the plaintiff, when taken in their plainest and most natural sense, and as they would be ordinarily understood, [must] obviously import the commission of crime punishable by indictment.”

 

The court states: 

Plaintiffs point to no statement in which defendants directly accuse any plaintiff of a crime.

Plaintiffs expect us to scale a mountain of inferences in order to reach the conclusion that defendants’ statements impute criminal acts to plaintiffs and render the statutory privilege of § 1443.1 inapplicable. We decline to engage in such inferential analysis, or to take a myriad of other analytical leaps plaintiffs ask us to make. Any connection between defendants’ statements and an accusation of criminal activity is far too tenuous for us to declare them as unprivileged for purposes of § 1443.1.

Since the statements were privileged for defamation purposes, the court found them privileged for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and for false light invasion of privacy.

See, Peterson v. Grisham