Garnished insurer not bound by sham judgment
Burton (who was convicted of first degree manslaughter) shot and killed Savage in an apparent road rage incident. Plaintiff sued Burton for the wrongful death of her husband, claiming that Burton violently and negligently shot Savage. The court entered a judgment against Burton for $1.2 million dollars. The judgment stated there had been a trial with witnesses and evidence presented. Savage then garnished State Farm, Burton's insurer. State Farm tried to get the judgment vacated. Instead, the trial court modified it -- instead of a trial, the modified judgment stated it was based on "stipulations."
The appellate court found that the judgment should have been vacated in its entirety. There was no evidence that there was a trial. The judge did not remember one. Plaintiff was not at the "accident" and could not testify as to the facts of the accident. Neither Burton nor his attorney were present. Therefore the judgment, which should be based on what actually happens in court, rather than on what might happen, was improper. It was also improper to try to prop it up by claiming it was a judgment based on stipulations. There is nothing in the record that shows that Burton or his attorney agreed to any of the facts the court found.
SAVAGE v. BURTON; 2008 OK CIV APP 20
In this road rage case, Burton was alleged to have improperly operated his vehicle and then shot and killed Moore. The court records revealed that after a supposed settlement, there was a trial and plaintiff (Moore’s spouse) was awarded $1.2 million in damages. State Farm, Burton’s automobile liability insurer was garnished, and sought to have the judgment vacated. The trial court refused to vacate the judgment, and instead modified it to reflect that instead of a trial, the parties stipulated to the facts upon which judgment was entered. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, stating:
It should go without saying that attorneys should only present truthful documents to the court for signing, and that judgments and orders signed by the court should reflect what actually occurred, not what could have, should have, or never could have occurred. We have no hesitancy in holding that the November 14, 2005 and January 25, 2007 judgments resulted from irregularities in obtaining the judgments, and the failure to vacate those judgments constituted an abuse of discretion.
With respect to the November 14, 2005 Judgment, the trial court could not recall a trial and had no independent evidence of a trial. It was also admitted that neither Burton nor his attorney appeared before the court that day. As a result, the judgment did not reflect what actually occurred. Deciding to transform the inaccurate judgment into stipulations of fact also has no basis in the record.
